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Volume 4,Issue 2

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26 February 2026

The Application Dilemma and Regulatory Path of Dissenting Opinions in International Investment Arbitration

Zhengzhong Han*
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1 Shandong Sport University, Rizhao 276826, Shandong, China
LNE 2026 , 4(2), 150–156; https://doi.org/10.18063/LNE.v4i2.1521
© 2026 by the Author. Licensee Whioce Publishing, Singapore. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
Abstract

Sudden dissenter's opinions are becoming more evident in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS); there remains a controversy over the legal foundation, functions, and system effects. Based on recent empirical research results and reforms by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)’s Working Group III under this background, this paper argues that because the issue of dissenting opinions has not been solved as a whole, it should also be traced back to some structural problems such as party nomination arrangements and the absence of legal precedents for trial, which are conducive to tactical decisions made during trials. The three regulatory pathways assessed were the 2023 UNCITRAL/ICSID Code of Conduct for Arbitrators, an ongoing appeal process, and the proposed Multilateral Investment Court. Therefore, this paper puts forward a step-by-step regulatory system based on these measures and designs it to fit with the pace of reform goals.

Keywords
Dissenting Opinions
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Party-Appointed Arbitrators
ISDS Reform
Appellate Mechanism
Multilateral Investment Court
References

[1] UNCTAD, 2022, Review of 2020 Investor-State Arbitration Decisions. UNCTAD Investment Policy Discussion Paper. visited on January 21, 2026, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/diaepcbinf2022d5_en.pdf

[2] Gáspár Szilágyi S, Létourneau-Tremblay L, 2019, A Question of Impartiality: Who are the Dissenting Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration?. PluriCourts Research Paper.

[3] Arato J, Claussen K, Langford M, 2023, The investor-state dispute settlement reform process: Design, dilemmas and discontents. Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 14(2): 127-133.

[4] Brown C, Ortino F, Arato J, 2019, Lack of Consistency and Coherence in the Interpretation of Legal Issues. Blog of the European Journal of International Law, EJIL: Talk.

[5] Rogers CA, 2023, Reconceptualizing the Party-Appointed Arbitrator and the Meaning of Impartiality. Harv. Int’l LJ, 64: 137.

[6] Brekoulakis S, Howard A, 2023, Impartiality and the construction of trust in investor-state dispute settlement. ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal, 38(3): 644-669.

[7] Behn D, Fauchald OK, Langford M, 2022, Introduction: The legitimacy crisis and the empirical turn. Behn et al, supra note, 14: 36.

[8] UN General Assembly, 2023, Code of Conduct for Arbitrators in International Investment Dispute Resolution and Code of Conduct for Judges in International Investment Dispute Resolution with respective commentary of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law resolution/adopted by the General Assembly.

[9] Kucik J, Puig S, 2023, Towards an effective appellate mechanism for ISDS tribunals. World Trade Review, 22(5): 562-583.

[10] Brodlija F, 2024, The Multilateral Investment Court: Necessary ISDS Reform or Self-Fulfilling Prophecy?. Arb. L. Rev., 15: 1.

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